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1. Introduction
 My topic in this paper is the nature of faith. Much of the discussion 
concerning the nature of faith proceeds by focussing on the relationship 
between faith and belief. In this paper, I explore a diﬀerent approach. I 
suggest that we approach the question of what faith involves by focussing on 
the relationship between faith and action.1  When we have faith, we 
generally manifest it in how we act; we perform acts of faith: we share our 
secrets, rely on other’s judgment, refrain from going through our partner’s 
emails, let our children prepare for an important exam without our 
interference. Religious faith, too is manifested in acts of faith: attending 
worship, singing the liturgy, fasting, embarking on a pilgrimage.  
 I argue that approaching faith by way of acts of faith, reveals that 
faith is a complex mental state whose elements go beyond doxastic states 
towards particular propositions. It also involves conative states and – perhaps 
more surprisingly – know how. is has consequences for the epistemology 
of faith: the role of testimony and experts, the importance of practices, and 
what we should make of Pascal’s advice for how to acquire faith.  
 Here is how this chapter will proceed. I start with some preliminary 
clarifications. Next, I motivate my strategy of approaching the nature of 
faith via acts of faith by drawing a parallel to the connection between 
virtuous actions and the nature of virtue. I then consider what makes an 
action an act of faith, arguing that it involves both a conative element as well 
as practical knowledge. I argue that consequently, we should take these 
elements to be partly constitutive of faith itself. Finally, I draw out some 
implications for the epistemology of faith. 
  
2. Some Preliminaries 
 Let me start by setting out some clarifications. I take faith to be the 
attitude that we attribute in sentences like the following:
She has faith in her abilities. 
He has faith that his partner is not cheating on him.
She has faith in her friend. 
He has faith in God. 
She has faith that God is benevolent. 
He has faith in humanity. 
 I am interested in the nature of this state. e starting point for my 
discussion will be our ordinary way of thinking about faith both secular and 
religious –  as expressed in our contemporary, popular usage of the term 
“faith” in the sentences above. And while I am interested in religious faith, 
too, I will not approach it from the vantage point of any particular religious 
tradition. In this respect my approach here diﬀers from that taken by some 
philosophers both contemporary and historical.
 As the sentences above make clear, faith attributions generally come 
in two kinds: faith that and faith in. In what follows, I will assume that 
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1 A notable exception is Buchak [2012], who also focusses on the connection between faith 
and acts of faith. I will critically discuss her account below. But it’s worth noting that our 
motivations are diﬀerent. Buchak is interested in the question whether faith can be rational, 
while I’m interested in what kind of mental state faith is. 
nevertheless faith is a unified mental state. us, we are attributing the same 
kind of mental state when we attribute faith in someone as we do when we 
attribute faith that something will happen. In particular, I will assume that 
both faith in someone and faith that something is the case involve an 
attitude towards a proposition.2  is seems straightforward enough for the 
case of faith that p but perhaps more controversial for case of faith in 
someone. But it’s hard to see how one could have faith in someone without 
having faith that they can, or will, or won’t do certain things. us, when I 
have faith in your abilities, I may have faith that you can succeed at the task 
at hand, or that you will rise to the challenge, or that you won’t give up. 
Someone who has faith in God may have faith that God is good, that God 
will answer her prayers, that God created the universe. 
 When it comes to the nature of faith, one important question 
concerns the nature of the propositional attitude involved. e candidate 
that first comes to mind is belief. But there are good reasons for thinking 
that it’s possible to have faith without belief; in particular, that it’s possible 
to have faith that p without believing that p.3 After all, it seems that I can 
have faith that my partner is not cheating on me even if I do not full-out 
believe that he is not having an aﬀair. (I may, for example, merely believe 
that he is probably not having an aﬀair.) Perhaps a more promising 
alternative is to think of this propositional attitude along the lines of degrees 
of belief, i.e. credences. us, it seems plausible that when I have faith that 
my partner is not cheating on me, I do generally, have some degree of 
confidence that he is not having an aﬀair. Perhaps I’m not maximally 
confident –  but to have faith that he’s not cheating in me, I cannot be 
maximally confident that he is having an aﬀair. 
 While this is an important issue, we shall set it aside for the 
remainder of the paper. is is because, while the relevant propositional 
attitude clearly is an important element of faith, there is more to faith than 
just the relevant propositional attitude. e focus of this paper is not on 
what kind of propositional attitude is involved in faith but rather what more 
is involved. 
3. Motivating the Strategy: A Parallel in Moral Psychology
 With these clarifications on the table, let’s turn to the actual task. My 
strategy will be to look at acts of faith. e central idea here is that we can 
learn about what faith involves by looking at the kinds of actions that a 
faithful person performs. is strategy needs some explanation: how could 
looking at an agent’s action be helpful? One way to motivate it is by looking 
at another area of philosophy where it is fruitful.4 
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2 is is not to insist that it is reducible to a propositional attitude; as we will see below. 
3 Buchak [2012] notes this point. Some maintain that faith that p is incompatible with 
belief that p; for example, see Schellenberg [2005].
4 My strategy here is to develop an analogy between the psychology of virtue and the 
psychology of faith. In religious contexts it is sometimes suggested that faith is itself a 
moral virtue. If you agree, the fact that virtue and faith have an analogous structure will not 
come as a surprise. But it will still be fruitful to draw out what this analogy tells us about 
the psychology of faith. For the purpose of this paper, I take no stand on whether religious 
faith is itself a moral virtue. As for non-religious faith, it clearly depends: having faith in 
humanity is a reasonable candidate. (See Preston-Roedder [2013].) Having faith in a 
corrupt inhumane immigration policy is not.   
 Consider moral virtue. Just like having faith, being virtuous seems to 
be closely connected to acting in characteristic ways. In particular, virtue is 
closely tied to morally admirable action. For one, morally admirable actions 
are a central way in which the agent manifests her moral virtue.5 Second, 
agents can be more or less virtuous; virtue is something that comes in 
degrees. Acts of virtue play a crucial role in spelling out what degrees of 
virtue consist in. ink about some specific virtue, like kindness. What 
distinguishes someone who has this virtue to a higher degree is that she has 
a greater ability to perform acts of kindness. She is in a position to perform 
acts of kindness even in situations in which others find this very diﬃcult – 
for example, when she is very busy or under great strain. Similarly, someone 
who has the virtue of justice to a great degree is capable of performing just 
acts even in circumstances in which others would not be able to do so: when 
dealing with very complicated situations, or when being just requires a 
substantive sacrifice on their part.
 What makes some particular action an act of virtue? Generally, in 
order to be an act of virtue, an action needs to conform with what is in fact 
the right thing to do. But it also needs to be motivated in the right way. An 
act of virtue is one that is done for the right reasons. And this, in turn, is 
partly a matter of being motivated by conative states – desires or intentions 
– with the right content and of the right kind. With regard to the former, 
they need to be desires with moral content, such as a desire to do what’s 
right, or fair, or just.6 With regard to the latter, they need to be intrinsic as 
opposed to instrumental. us, consider the Kantian shopkeeper who gives 
his customers the right change because he thinks that such a policy is the 
best way to keep his business profitable.7 Giving others the right change is 
the right thing to do. But the shopkeeper’s action is not an act of virtue. e 
problem is that the shopkeeper is motivated by the wrong kind of desire. His 
concern is with running a profitable business, as opposed to treating his 
customers fairly for its own sake. Insofar as he cares about treating his 
customers fairly, this concern is purely instrumental. 
 Having the right kind of desires is important for morally admirable 
actions; but it’s not the only thing that matters. us, suppose that the 
shopkeeper does genuinely desire to do what’s right and for its own sake but 
that he is extremely unreliable in figuring out what this is; he’s as likely to 
give money to charity as he is to give to the KKK. ere may be various 
reasons for his unreliability. He may be attracted to strange moral principles. 
Or, even if there is nothing wrong with the moral principles that he adheres 
to, he may be using a very unreliable decision-procedure when he’s engaging 
in moral deliberations (maybe, for example, he completely lacks confidence 
in his own moral deliberation and so defers to a friend who has terrible 
moral judgment). However this may be, suppose that, while he is often led 
astray, on this particular occasion, he gets it right. Is his right action an act of 
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5 I will be using the terms “morally admirable action” and “act of virtue” interchangeably. 
6 My claim that morally worthy actions need to be motivated by a desire with moral 
content, such as a desire to do what’s morally right, or fair, or just, is controversial in the 
literature on moral worth. A number of authors – most notably Arpaly [2003] and 
Markovits [2010] – have argued that morally worthy actions are motivated by desires for 
the right-making reasons de re, for example, the desire to relieve someone’s pain. I defend 
the claim assumed here and criticize the alternatives in my [2015].
7 For the original case, see Kant [1997] (4:390).
virtue? It seems clear that it is not. e problem is that the shopkeeper’s 
right action was, in an important sense, only a lucky fluke. He did the right 
thing but he could have easily gotten it wrong. us, the right kinds of 
desires are not enough to make a right action an act of virtue; the agent also 
needs to be guided by knowledge how to do the right thing. Acts of virtue 
thus require practical knowledge: knowledge how to do the right, fair, just, 
or kind thing.8 
 At this point, we can draw some preliminary conclusions about 
virtue. Acts of virtue are motivated by both the right kind of desire and 
moral knowledge. And since virtue is partly constituted by the ability to 
perform acts of virtue, it follows that these desires – the desire to do what’s 
right, fair, just –  and practical moral knowledge –  knowledge how to do 
what’s right, fair, just – are partly constitutive of virtue itself.9 is, of course, 
is not to say that these are the only constituents of virtue. For example, 
virtue may well involve important emotional dispositions and patterns of 
attention.10  Nevertheless the relevant desires and practical knowledge are 
necessary: they underpin the virtuous agent’s ability to do the right thing for 
the right reasons. 
Applying the Strategy: What is an Act of Faith? 
 We can apply the same strategy to faith: we can get clear on what is 
involved in faith by looking at what makes an action an act of faith. ere 
are typical ways of acting that express one’s faith. If I have faith in my 
friend’s abilities, then I might trust her with a particularly diﬃcult task. If I 
have faith that my brother will repay me, I may lend him money. But clearly 
not any instance of such an action is an act of faith. Suppose that John lends 
his estranged brother some money but does so because it gives him a sense 
of superiority; he considers his brother to be a waste of space and he does 
not have the slightest hope that he will ever repay him – nor does he care 
about being repaid. But giving him money reminds John of the fact how 
much more successful he’s been in life than his brother –  a feeling, he 
relishes immensely. Or suppose that Ahmed goes on a hajj but solely 
because he knows that it will secure his reputation as a devout Muslim, 
which will benefit his business. While lending someone money and 
undertaking a pilgrimage can be and often are acts of faith, they are not acts 
of faith in the case of John and Ahmed. is is because being an act of faith 
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8 I am sympathetic to the Stanley & Williamson [2001] line on know how, on which know 
how is a kind of propositional knowledge. But I do not think that my argument depends on 
accepting intellectualism.  
9 In her [2001], Julia Driver argues that moral knowledge is not a requirement of virtue. But 
Driver’s arguments target primarily a very intellectualized theoretical knowledge – 
knowledge that one’s action is right or fair – and so we can set her criticism aside for the 
purposes of this paper. I argue against her view in more detail in my [2015]. See also 
Brennan [2007]. 
10 Bommarito [2013]. And these two elements may also be crucial to the virtuous agent’s 
ability to perform acts of virtue. (e fact that one is upset by injustice may make one more 
likely to notice it and hence more likely to know what to do and thereby perform the 
relevant act of virtue. ) But they may also be important for virtue for its own sake. us, it’s 
plausible to think that the virtuous agent performs acts of virtue joyfully, with a sense of 
purpose and satisfaction. My point here really is to highlight that once we pay attention to 
acts of virtue, knowledge – knowledge how to perform the just, honest, kind thing – 
emerges as one central ingredient in virtue.
is not only about what is being done but about how it’s motivated. John and 
Ahmed’s actions are not done for the right reasons. 
 As with acts of virtue, one central ingredient are the right kinds of 
conative states or desires. is is one crucial respect in which both John’s and 
Ahmed’s actions seem lacking; both agents are ultimately motivated by 
selfish desires. John’s lending his brother money is not motivated by concern 
for his brother. It is motivated by a desire to feel good about himself. 
Similarly, Ahmed’s decision to undertake a hajj is motivated by a desire to 
benefit his business; it is not motivated by a desire to fulfill his religious duty 
as a muslim. 
 us, whether an action is an act of faith is, in part, a matter of the 
desire that motivates the agent. For an action to express faith in that 
particular person or cause (or faith that p, where p is a proposition that 
concerns that person or cause), it needs to be motivated by concern for that 
person or cause. Moreover, this concern cannot be instrumental.11 us, if 
John lends his brother money because he regards his brother as a means to 
some further good (because he wants his brother to help him in some 
substantive way in return), then his action is not an act of faith. Similarly, if 
Ahmed embarks on the hajj out of a desire to fulfill Allah’s command but he 
cares about Allah’s command only because he wants to be seen as a devout 
muslim, then his action is not an act of faith. 
 Desires are important for whether an action counts as an act of faith. 
But just as in the case of morally worthy actions, they are not the only thing 
that matters. us, imagine that Kate and Samira are collaborating on a big 
and diﬃcult project. ey divide the tasks between them and agree who will 
do what. Samira ends up with a very tricky and challenging task. She works 
away at it, while Kate stays out of her way. Let’s also suppose that Kate 
genuinely wants Samira to do well and to be successful. Is this enough to 
make her agreement that Samira should do this part of the work and her 
subsequent lack of interference acts of faith? Do they express Kate’s faith in 
Samira’s abilities? I do not think that this is clear. From the description that 
I have given, it is very likely that these are acts of faith. But it depends on 
the details. To know for sure, we need to know more about Kate. 
 Suppose we fill in the details as follows: Kate generally means well 
but she is a hopeless micromanager. Whenever she is supposed to 
collaborate with her colleagues, she constantly monitors their progress, butts 
in with unsolicited advice, oﬀers “help”, and sometimes even does part of the 
others’ work herself. is is not malicious. Kate claims that she trusts her 
colleagues and when she “helps” or does part of the work herself, contrary to 
what they had agreed on, she always does it from good intentions – “it will 
be quicker if I do it myself ” or “I’ll just get on with it, since I have a spare 
moment anyway.” Now, in this particular case, Kate does not meddle with 
Samira’s work. But it’s not because she has seen the error of her ways; she 
was just dealing with some personal problems that distracted her. 
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11 Does the concern need to be intrinsic? Perhaps not. Consider casting a vote in support of 
a politician. is may well constitute an act of faith (expressing your faith in that politician’s 
abilities to lead the country). is is so even if you may not care about the politician or her 
abilities for their own sake. You care about them in virtue of caring about what’s good for 
your country. But even in this case, I do not think that your concern is purely instrumental. 
Rather it’s extrinsic. You care about the politician and her abilities because you care about 
what’s good for your country not as a means to some further end. See Langton [2007] for a 
discussion of the distinction between intrinsic/extrinsic and instrumental value.    
 If we fill in the details of the case in this way, it seems clear that 
while Kate’s lack of interference may look like an act of faith, it is not an act 
of faith. e problem here does is not one of having the wrong kinds of 
desires motivating Kate. Rather, what seems to be amiss is a particular kind 
of know how. In fact, it seems tempting to describe Kate’s shortcoming as a 
matter of her not knowing how to have faith in others or in their abilities. 
Let’s hone in a bit more on what kind of know how Kate is lacking. e 
relevant know how has to do with how we relate to other people; it’s 
interpersonal knowledge. is includes knowledge how to trust someone, 
how to rely on them, how to be helpful, how and when to oﬀer advice, how 
to treat them respectfully. us, the problem seems to be that Kate does not 
know how to leave others alone, how to be supportive without being 
intrusive, how to keep an eye out for how they’re doing without imposing on 
them. To be an act of faith, an action must be guided by such knowledge. 
And since Kate is missing this know how her actions are not acts of faith.
 Kate’s illustrates one way in which agents can lack the know how 
that’s important for acts of faith. But agents can lack the relevant know how 
in a diﬀerent way, too. Imagine Pawel, who is the very opposite of Kate: he is 
trusting to the extreme and completely indiscriminate in who he relies on. 
He is readily willing to put his life and wellbeing and those of others in the 
hands of complete strangers. He always believes what others tell him and 
never second-guesses anyone’s motivations. He seems to be completely 
oblivious to obvious signs that someone is trying to take advantage of him. 
And he has such high opinion of others, including of his students, and is so 
confident that they will succeed in what they set out to do, that it catches 
him by surprise when they fail. Suppose that Pawel trusts his student with a 
particularly challenging and important task. Is his action an act of faith? Just 
as in Kate’s case, it seems to me that it is not. Rather than being expressions 
of faith, they look like expressions of imprudence and naïveté. Again, the 
culprit here does not seem to be a wrong desire. Rather, what’s amiss is a 
discriminatory ability, it’s knowledge how to rely on others, how to keep an 
eye on what they are doing, how to recognize whether someone is 
trustworthy. 
 e same is true for religious cases. Consider the Christian 
fundamentalist, who believes that a way to glorify God is to harangue 
women who are entering Planned Parenthood clinics. While we may grant 
that the Christian fundamentalist herself may describe her action as an act 
of faith, we would hesitate to call it so ourselves (at least not without putting 
it in parenthesis). e explanation for this is precisely that to say that 
something was a religious act of faith is to say that it manifested knowledge 
how to engage God. But, I take it, we think that the Christian 
fundamentalist is misguided about how to engage God. One does not 
glorify God by committing hateful acts. 
 Perhaps you agree that neither Kate’s nor Pawel’s actions constitute 
acts of faith. But you might still be skeptical whether their failing is best 
thought of as a lack of knowledge. Here is a reason for thinking that this is 
what it is: both are insensitive, albeit in diﬀerent ways, to a particular class of 
evidence. is is evidence that concerns others’ abilities, their motives, their 
commitments, whether they need help or advice and what kind of help or 
advice they would benefit from. As Ryan Preston-Roedders rightly notes in 
his discussion of faith of humanity, such faith involves a sensitivity to a 
particular kind of evidence about others: 
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 When someone who has such faith does take on the risks associated, 
say, with relying on someone or trying to reform him, despite 
reasonable doubts about his reliability or capacity for reform, she does 
not take on these risks all at once or irrevocably, at least, not when she 
can help it. In other words, when she comes to believe that some one 
is morally decent in some respect, she does not simply charge ahead 
blindly in her dealings with him. Rather, in her ongoing interaction 
with him, she remains sensitive to new evidence concerning the 
quality of his character and the badness of the results that will occur if 
he turns out to be base. And if it becomes clear to her, say, that these 
results are too bad or the likelihood of their occurrence too high, she 
may try to end her reliance on him, or abandon her attempt to reform 
him.12 
 As it’s this sensitivity that is lacking in Kate and Pawel, it seems 
right to describe their failing as a lack of knowledge. ey lack knowledge 
how to engage with others and relate to them appropriately. is precludes 
them from performing the relevant act of faith. 
 To bring out the importance of both the right kinds of desires and 
knowledge to acts of faith, I want to contrast my proposal with an 
alternative account suggested by Buchak. As already noted, Buchak also 
approaches the nature of faith by way of acts of faith. Her idea is that having 
faith that p involves a disposition to take certain risks. ese risks are a 
matter of acting on the assumption that p, rather than looking for more 
evidence concerning p’s truth. When you have faith that John can succeed, 
you act on the assumption that he can succeed, even if your evidence 
regarding John’s abilities is inconclusive. Importantly, what makes your 
reliance an act of faith is that you forgo searching for further evidence 
concerning John’s abilities. Buchak takes this idea to motivate the following 
as an analysis of faith: 
A person has faith that X, expressed by A, if and only if that person 
performs act A when there is some alternative act B such that he 
strictly prefers A&X to B&X and he strictly prefers B&~X to A&~X, 
and the person prefers {to commit to A before he examines additional 
evidence} rather than {to postpone his decision about A until he 
examines additional evidence}.13
 I do think that Buchak is right that the connection between acts of 
faith and forgoing the search for further evidence is important. But Buchak 
oﬀers her account as also giving suﬃcient conditions for an action to 
constitute an act of faith and this is less plausible. inking of acts of faith 
merely in terms of preferences has some strange results. 
 us, suppose I have the habit of doodling during boring talks. In 
particular, I like to write people’s names in loopy letters and draw balloons 
and puppies around them when they are nice and fists and thunders when 
they are nasty. I never show my doodles to anyone but it does give me a 
sense of satisfaction to sort people correctly, and my preferences exhibit the 
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13 Buchak [2012], p. ? 
structure Buchak requires.14 Beyoncé’s name pops into my head. Since I’m 
stuck in a talk, looking for more evidence is not an option and, as I’m bored, 
I prefer to get on with my doodling. I go for the balloons and puppies. 
 is action then meets all of Buchak’s conditions for an act of faith. 
But it seems very strange to call it that. ere are two reasons for this. 
While, my preferences may have the right content and structure, they are 
not of the right kind. I don’t really care about Beyoncé or whether she is 
nice. My doodling is just a way to make time pass more quickly. While I do 
prefer to decorate someone’s name with balloons and puppies only if they 
are nice, this is not because I care about this person’s character in particular. I 
just take satisfaction in getting it right. I’m playing a game with myself. 
 But even if the question whether Beyoncé was nice was genuinely 
important to me and something I really care about for its own sake, it would 
still be very odd to call my doodling an act of faith. I think the explanation 
for this has to do with practical knowledge that’s interpersonal. Recall, we 
said that acts of faith manifest knowledge of how to have faith in others. 
is knowledge includes knowledge how to rely on others, how to trust 
them, how to be supportive. My doodling does not manifest any such 
knowledge because my doodling is an entirely solitary and self-centered 
activity; it does not engage Beyoncé in any way. Buchak’s account thus may 
well capture a necessary condition for an action to constitute an act of faith. 
But it does not capture all there is to acts of faith. e full story will have to 
include the nature of the desires motivating the agent and her practical 
knowledge. 
 Acts of faith thus have a structure that’s very similar to acts of virtue. 
Both require the kinds of desires as well as practical knowledge. is is not 
entirely surprising. Acts of moral virtue follow what Aristotle called the 
doctrine of the mean: they straddle the mean between two moral vices of 
excess. Performing an act of virtue requires an agent to competently navigate 
between those two poles of excess. is requires know how. us, when the 
agent gets it right, when she acts kindly or justly, this is not by accident but 
because she was sensitive to the relevant evidential considerations. Acts of 
faith fit a similar pattern: they straddle the mean between gullibility and 
distrust. In performing an act of faith, an agent generally takes a risk. is 
could be material risk –  if Samira does not pull through on her end of the 
project, this might jeopardize Kate’s promotion. Or it could be emotional 
risk –  perhaps Pawel will be deeply disappointed if his student does not 
manage to overcome the challenge. And for the action to constitute an act of 
faith, this risk must be taken clear-sightedly, guided by know how.   
4. From Acts of Faith to the Nature of Faith
 I have argued that acts of faith require the right kinds of desires as 
well as practical knowledge. Let us now turn from acts of faith to faith itself: 
faith in someone’s abilities, faith that one’s partner is not cheating, faith that 
God exists. For this, we need a better grip on the relationship between faith 
and actions: between having faith and performing acts of faith. 
 Agents who have faith tend to act in characteristic ways. But to say 
that they tend to act in these ways is not to say that they will do so. I may 
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14 I strictly prefer that X is nice & I draw balloons and puppies to X is nice & I draw fists and 
thunders, and I strictly prefer X is not nice & I draw fists and thunders to X is not nice & I 
draw balloons and puppies. 
have faith in your abilities but no opportunity to act on it or express it. Or I 
may have a strong incentive to be discrete about this fact. Nevertheless, 
plausibly, faith involves the disposition to act in certain ways. Having faith 
is, in part, a matter of being disposed to perform acts of faith. In fact, we can 
say something stronger: to the extent that I have faith – for example, faith in 
your ability – I have the ability to perform acts of faith. 
 We can move from our discussion of acts of faith to conclusions 
about faith itself. Faith is, in part, a matter of having the ability to perform 
acts of faith. Acts of faith require the right kinds of desires along with the 
relevant know how. And so, this suggests that having faith is, in part, a 
matter of having the right kinds of desires along with the right kind of know 
how. It’s partly constituted by these desires and the know how in question. If 
having faith involves particular kinds of desires as well as particular practical 
knowledge, then it’s not surprising that it involves a disposition to act. For 
one, desires and dispositions are closely connected –  depending on 
allegiances in the philosophy of mind, having a particular desire just is a 
matter of being disposed to act in certain ways or it’s the categorical basis of 
these dispositions. Second, a person who has faith is disposed to act in 
characteristic ways because she has the ability to perform those acts. And 
she has that ability in virtue of having the relevant practical knowledge.
 What about religious faith? My discussion so far has, for the most 
part, focussed on examples of secular faith. Secular faith, I have argued, 
require interpersonal know how. But I think the considerations that support 
this requirement in the secular case straightforwardly carry over to the 
religious case, too. Religious faith diﬀers from secular faith not in what of 
kind mental state it is but rather in its object. Acts of secular faith concern 
other people. Acts of religious faith (often) concern God. Insofar as it is 
plausible that acts of secular faith need to be guided by knowledge how to 
relate to and engage with others, it seems plausible that acts of religious faith 
require knowledge how to relate and engage with God. Religious faith, too, 
then involves a particular kind of practical knowledge. 
 One advantage of the present account is that this gives us an 
attractive way of spelling out what degrees of faith consist in. Faith comes in 
diﬀerent strengths. I can have more or less faith in your abilities. I can have 
more or less faith that my partner is not cheating on me. I can have more or 
less faith in God. A plausible account of the nature of faith should shed light 
on this feature. 
 If we take faith to be primarily a matter of belief, then it’s very 
tempting to spell out degrees of faith directly in terms of the strength of 
one’s convictions. A person’s faith is stronger, the stronger she believes in the 
relevant proposition – the higher her level of certainty. But this simply does 
not ring true. Two agents may have exactly the same level of confidence in 
the proposition that John will succeed at a diﬃcult task without thereby 
having the same degrees of faith that he will succeed or the same degree of 
faith in his abilities. For suppose that the first, while being fairly confident of 
John’s success, nevertheless constantly watches over his progress and double-
checks every step. e second agent, on the other hand, simply lets John get 
on with his work, making it clear that they are available to help if needed 
but won’t otherwise interfere. It seems clear that the latter has significantly 
more faith that John will succeed as well having significantly more faith in 
John’s abilities. eir having greater faith is a matter of what they are willing 
and able to do; it’s a matter of which acts of faith they are in a position to 
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perform. Sharing a trivial bit of oﬃce gossip as an act of faith requires little 
faith in my friend’s trustworthiness. Sharing my deepest and darkest secret 
requires considerably stronger faith. Similarly, it takes only little faith to 
attend a prayer meeting; it takes a lot more to give away all of one’s earthly 
possessions and join a convent.
 is fits naturally with the present account. After all, which acts of 
faith an agent is in a position to perform is not simply a function of their 
degree of belief in the relevant proposition. It also depends on their desires 
as well as on what they know how to do; these elements partly constitute 
faith. Faith emerges as a rich and complex psychological state, which 
involves doxastic elements, conative states, as well as practical knowledge. 
All these elements admit of degrees, and so an agent’s degree of faith is 
partly determined by the strength of her desires and on her degree of know 
how. And the strength of one’s desires and the extend of one’s know how 
bears directly on which actions one is in a position to perform.  
 e conclusion that faith constitutively involves know how may seem 
surprising. After all, you might think that we can distinguish between 
having faith on the one hand and knowing how to express it on the other. 
But I do not think that such a distinction withstands closer scrutiny. Take 
the parents who care about their child and profess that they have faith in 
their child’s good judgment. Nevertheless, they constantly hover over their 
child, oﬀering unsolicited advice, and shielding them from any mildly risky 
adventure. It doesn’t seem right to say that they really do have faith in their 
child but don’t know how to show it. It seems much more plausible to say 
that they are self-deceived about whether they have faith in their child. 
Similarly, it seems very odd to say that the suicide bomber has great faith, 
she was just mistaken about how to express it. Insofar as the suicide bomber 
is deeply misguided about how to engage God and what her religious 
commitment requires of her, she just does not have faith – she merely thinks 
that she does. 
 If this is right, then there is an important externalist element to faith. 
Propositional knowledge is factive: knowing that p entails that p. And 
plausibly, practical knowledge is in important respects factive, too.15 No one 
knows how to catch a unicorn. For good reason: none exist. is seems to 
carry over to the case of the interpersonal knowledge involved in faith. If 
there is no Queen of France, you cannot know how to engage her and so you 
cannot have faith in her. And if there is no God, you cannot know how to 
engage Him either. If faith is partly constituted by know how, then faith 
inherits this factivity.16 Is this strange? Upon reflection it strikes me as right. 
When it’s entirely clear and uncontroversial that a particular entity does not 
exist (or is merely fictional), we tend to attribute (false) belief rather than 
faith. us, we don’t say that the child has faith in the tooth fairy – we say 
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15 I seems to me that whether or not we take know how to be factive in this way is plausible 
no matter whether are intellectualists or not. But if, following Williamson & Stanley 
[2001], we do accept intellectualism, then it’s especially clear that it must be so. You know 
how to encourage your brother only if you know that W is a way to encourage your brother. 
And this assumes that you do have a brother. I’m grateful to an anonymous referee for 
prompting me to think through these issues. 
16 Of course, there is an important way in which it is not factive: my having faith that John 
will win the election is compatible with his ultimately loosing it. But it does entail that John 
exists. 
that they believe in her. Similarly, atheists do not describe themselves as 
lacking faith in God – they describe themselves as lacking belief in God. 
And they tend to refer to those who do subscribe to a particular religion as 
believers, not as the faithful.17  
 You may worry that faith being factive will have some strange results. 
Would it not license those of religious faith to infer that God exists? After 
all, if faith necessarily involves the relevant interpersonal know how and this 
know how entails that its object exists, then knowing that one has faith 
would straightforwardly enable one to draw this inference. But herein lies 
the snag. Having faith is not enough to draw the inference, you need to 
know you have it. But on the picture presented here, faith will not be 
transparent because know how is not transparent. We can be mistaken about 
what we know how to do. ( Just think of the overconfident student in your 
intro class.) And in the case of interpersonal know how, there is another 
source of uncertainty: you may not be in a position to know whether you 
have the relevant know how because you may not be in a position to know 
whether the relevant party exists. Agents thus do not have ultimate 
authority over whether they have faith, nor – think again of the suicide 
bomber –  whether their action constitutes an act of faith.18 
 I have been arguing that since the desires of a particular kind and 
practical knowledge are required for acts of faith, we should take them to be 
partly constitutive of faith itself. us, for example, to have faith in your 
abilities is partly constituted by intrinsic desires concerning you – such as a 
desire that you perform well in the task, that you do it without my 
interference, that you get credit for it – as well as practical knowledge how 
to engage with you –  how to support you in your endeavor without 
interfering and being intrusive, how and when to oﬀer advice, etc. As we 
have seen in the beginning, in addition, faith also involves a doxastic 
attitude: to have faith in your abilities, I need to have at least some 
confidence that, for example, you will succeed in the task at hand. At the 
very least then, faith involves three distinct elements: doxastic states, desires, 
practical knowledge. Are these enough for a complete analysis of faith? 
 I suspect not. Unfortunately, a complete analysis of faith is beyond 
the scope of this paper; but let me point towards two further elements that 
seem important. e first concerns emotional states and reactive attitudes. 
When I have faith in your abilities, I am likely to take pleasure in your 
success. I am likely to feel proud of you when you meet my expectations and 
disappointed when you fail to live up to them. When we put our faith in 
someone, we are likely to feel betrayed when they let us down. Religious 
faith also typically involves emotional and reactive attitudes –  just think 
about the emotional range expressed in the Psalms of the Old Testament. 
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17 is is not to say that there cannot be conversational contexts, in which an atheist can 
describe someone who is religious as having faith. A conversation is a cooperative enterprise 
and sometimes the proposition that there may be a God can be part of the common 
ground. But what is common ground need not be believed. See Stalnaker [1978] and Lewis 
[1979]. 
18 See Benton [ms.] for a detailed version of this argument. Benton’s focus is on knowing 
another person rather than on interpersonal know how but the arguments carry over.   
ey range from disappointment and sadness to gratitude and awe.19 
Second, it seems plausible that faith involves taking an attitude towards our 
own attitudes. When I have faith in your abilities, I do not merely have a 
desire and some level of confidence regarding your success; I generally also 
take a particular stance towards this desire and level of confidence. In 
particular, I take my confidence and my desire to license my acting and 
feeling in characteristic ways, to justify my act of faith.20 
5. e Epistemology of Faith
 So far, my focus has been on unpacking the complex attitude of faith. 
I have argued that attending to what makes an action an act of faith draws 
our attention to two crucial components: desire and, more surprisingly, know 
how. Faith may involve going beyond the evidence in ways that are 
incompatible with theoretical knowledge; but it requires doing so in a 
skillful way, guided by practical knowledge. My aim in this section is to draw 
out some epistemic consequences of this. I will start out with general 
observations about the epistemology of faith; I will then focus on religious 
faith, in particular. 
Testimony, Expertise, and Faith 
 e first consequence is the social dimension of acquiring faith.  We 
acquire many of our beliefs from other people. We share what we know with 
others, by giving them testimony. We rely on their knowledge by deferring 
to experts. Just as much of our knowledge is shared knowledge, so it seems 
that many kinds of faith are shared. Faith, it seems, can be transmitted from 
one person to the next.    
 Of course, insofar as faith involves a doxastic element, there is room 
for testimony to play an important role in the transmission of faith. My faith 
in your abilities may be based in part on my friend’s testimony about your 
skillfulness and reliability. Mark’s faith in God may be partly based on his 
reading of the bible. And so it’s perhaps not surprising that the 
contributions of social epistemology to the epistemology of faith in general 
and religious faith in particular have revolved around testimony (and it’s 
unruly sibling, disagreement).21 is topic is undoubtedly important. But if 
the account of faith that I have defended here is correct, then testimony is 
not the only epistemic phenomenon that matters in the transmission of 
faith. I have suggested that faith involves practical knowledge; it is partly 
constituted by know how. And just like belief, practical knowledge, too, is 
something we often acquire from others.
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19 See also Platinga [2000], who argues that faith involves the right kinds of “aﬀectations”: 
the person of faith “finds the whole scheme of salvation enormously attractive, delightful, 
moving, a source of amazed wonderment.” (p. 292)  For the particular significance of awe in 
religious faith and experience, see Wettstein [2012], p. 38. Wettstein also stresses the 
importance of ritual and know how in faith and suggests that one may have religious faith 
in the absence of religious belief. I do think that faith involves a doxastic element but 
discussing its precise nature is beyond the scope of this essay.   
20 is line of thought is developed in more detail by Martin [2013], chapter 1. While 
Martin’s focus there is an analysis of hope, the considerations seem to carry over the the 
case of faith. (Indeed, Martin later argues that faith is a particular kind of hope.) 
21 For example, in Callahan & O’Connor [2014] the focus is very much on the 
epistemology of testimony and disagreement. 
 How is know how transmitted? We often acquire beliefs by relying 
on what others tell us. Similarly, we often acquire know how by relying on 
what others show us; by relying on their demonstrations of what to do and 
how to act. Showing is the practical analogue of assertion. In particular, 
showing seems to be governed by the same kind of epistemic norms as 
telling. Just as there are good reasons for thinking that assertion is governed 
by the knowledge norm, so there are good reasons for thinking that the act 
of showing is governed by a knowledge norm, too.22
 is means that when it comes to faith there is room for reliance on 
two kinds of experts: experts who can tell you about the proposition relevant 
to your faith and experts who can transmit the know how that’s relevant to 
performing acts of faith. In the case of secular faith – such as faith that my 
friend will complete her assignment on time or faith in my partner – much 
of this practical knowledge is so mundane that we don’t give it much 
thought. But in other cases acquiring faith does require seeking out mentors 
and experts that we consciously try to emulate and learn from. us, a set of 
imagine over-anxious and over-protective parents who are both aware of 
their overprotective tendencies and of the fact that  they need to leave their 
teenage children room to grow and to make mistakes. ese parents might 
resolve to have faith in their children and they might to try to acquire the 
relevant know how – know how to support their children without doing the 
work for them, how to develop the right kind of relationship with them – by 
looking at what those whose parenting style they aspire to, do. 
 In the religious case, it means that religious expertise is not 
exhausted being able to give authoritative testimony on religious matters. 
ere is room for religious expertise that consists in religious know how.  
e Role and Importance of Religious Practices
 Religious know how is closely related to religious practices. Being a 
Catholic involves doing things: attending mass, going to confession, taking 
communion, praying. Being a Muslim involves declaring one’s faith, saying 
prayer, fasting, giving to charity, going to Mecca. (In fact, the five pillars of 
Islam all concern actions.) And so, a plausible account of religious faith: it 
should shed light on the connection between religious faith and religious 
practices and it should explain their significance.  
 One virtue of the present account of faith is that it gives us a natural 
way to accommodate and explain the importance of religious practices. On 
the present picture, having faith is, in part, a matter of having the ability to 
perform acts of faith. e ability to perform acts of faith requires practical 
knowledge. We have seen that for acts of faith that concern other people, 
this practical knowledge crucially involves inter-personal knowledge: 
knowledge how to engage with the other person, how to rely on them, how 
to trust someone, etc. Acts of faith in the context of religious faith, generally 
concern God. To see that this is plausible, note that those who perform 
characteristic acts of faith generally understand these acts in particular ways. 
ey attend worship because they take this to be a way of giving thanks to 
God. ey pray because they take this to be a way to give thanks and to 
petition God. Catholics go to confession because they understand this to be 
a way to ask God’s forgiveness. Various denomination follow dietary rules 
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22 See Moore [1959], Williamson [2000], Benton [2011] for cases in support of the former, 
and Buckwalter & Turring [2014] for a case in support of the latter. 
and rules of personal appearance because they take these to be ways to honor 
God or show respect. In other words, they perform these characteristic acts 
because they take them to be ways of engaging God. Consequently, it seems 
plausible that they require knowledge how to engage God.
 is suggests that religious practices are important because engaging 
in them is a way to acquire the relevant know how. at religious practices 
can be the source of such knowledge has been recently defended by Terrence 
Cuneo. He calls this practical knowledge ritual knowledge. His discussion 
focussed on the significance of the Christian-Orthodox liturgy, arguing that 
it both provides an opportunity to acquire ritual knowledge as well as to 
manifest it. us, he argues:  
the liturgy provides the materials for not only engaging but also 
knowing how to engage God. Or more precisely: the liturgy provides 
the materials by which a person can acquire such knowledge and a 
context in which she can exercise or enact it. For if one grasps these 
ways of acting in such a way that one understands them to be ways of 
blessing, petitioning, and thanking God, then one knows how to 
engage God by performing actions such as blessing, petitioning, and 
thanking God. Or more precisely yet: to the extent that one grasps and 
suﬃciently understands these ways of acting, one knows how to bless, 
petition, and thank God in their ritualized forms. One has ritual 
knowledge."23
 Cuneo’s point straightforwardly generalizes to other religious 
practices and to other religious traditions. Practical knowledge is acquired by 
doing. Again, here the structure of faith echoes the structure of moral virtue. 
As Aristotle noted with respect to the latter, we become virtuous by doing 
virtuous deeds: “we become just by doing just actions, temperate by 
temperate actions, and courageous by courageous actions.” Similarly, since 
faith is partly a matter of know how, acquiring faith is a matter of 
performing acts of faith. It also follows that acquiring faith is something 
that happens over time. A conversion experience may set one on the path to 
acquire faith. But it is not, itself, suﬃcient for acquiring faith and it may not 
be necessary either.  
Making sense of Pascal ’s Advice
Recall Pascal’s advice for what to do in order to acquire religious faith: 
You would like to attain faith, and do not know the way; you would like 
to cure yourself of unbelief, and ask the remedy for it. Learn of those who 
have been bound like you, and who now stake all their possessions. [...] 
Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they believed, taking 
the holy water, having masses said, etc. …24
Pascal’s advice has generally been read as advice on how to acquire particular 
religious beliefs. As such it has been subject to a sleuth of criticism and 
rightly so. Read in this way, it is triply suspect. It’s psychologically suspect: 
can you really acquire a belief that p simply by pretending to belief that p? 
And it’s epistemically suspect: even if you can, it seems that doing so would 
be epistemically irrational since your belief would be based on prudential 
considerations, rather than on evidence. Finally, even if you manage to 
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23 Cuneo [2014], p. 383. 
24 Pascal [1670] as cited in Hayek [2012].
induce in yourself the relevant belief, it seems surprising that this should be 
enough for acquiring religious faith. It seems too easy.  
 Faith’s being partly constituted by know how makes available an 
alternative take on Pascal’s advice –  particularly in light of our previous 
discussion of how know how can be transmitted between agents and the role 
of religious practices in the know how relevant to religious faith. And read 
in this way, Pascal’s advice seems perfectly sound. We can motivate this 
alternative reading by considering a parallel with the moral case again. 
Suppose I want to become virtuous. It does not matter why; perhaps, I really 
desire to become good for its own sake or perhaps I desire it because it will 
confer some other benefit on me (I want to impress someone or I have read 
a psychological study according to which virtuous people tend to be 
happier.) How should I go about this? Consider the moral analogue of 
Pascal’s advice: follow the ways of those whose virtue you are hoping to 
emulate, give to charity, volunteer in homeless shelters, tend to the sick and 
needy. is seems like perfectly sound advice – despite the fact that virtue 
has a doxastic component.  After all, it’s plausible to think that being 
virtuous involves having certain beliefs – such as the belief that suﬀering is a 
bad thing, that you should jump into a pond to save a drowning child, that 
there is no moral diﬀerence between diﬀerent sexes, races, and nationalities, 
etc. If the aim of the advice was to induce these beliefs, then we should view 
it with suspicion. Insofar as we don’t, this is because we take the advice to 
target other elements of virtue. In particular, following this advice seems like 
a good way to acquire the relevant practical knowledge: knowledge how to 
help, how to respond to suﬀering, how to do good. Of course, merely 
imitating others is probably not suﬃcient to become virtuous.25 
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to think that some imitation is 
necessary. is is why it’s good advice in the moral case. 
 I suggest that we can read Pascal’s original advice in the same spirit. 
On this reading, the advice is not (primarily) concerned with the doxastic 
element of faith but rather with the relevant know how. Participating in 
religious practices is a way to acquire what Cuneo calls ritual knowledge; 
one can come to know “how to bless, petition, and thank God in their 
ritualized forms” and thereby come to know how to engage God.26  Of 
course, this practical knowledge alone is not suﬃcient for having religious 
faith. Nevertheless, it’s a necessary component. And so, following this advice, 




 Faith and action are closely connected. ose who have faith 
generally perform acts of faith. Consequently, I have argued, we can 
approach questions about the nature of the former by way of the latter. at 
is, we can get clear on what faith is by thinking about what it takes for an 
action to be an act of faith. is approach is fruitful because it widens our 
perspective on what faith involves. 
 is doxastic element – question whether it’s a belief or some other 
state, questions about the norms that govern its rationality – has received 
-15-
25 See Annas [2011].
26 Cuneo [2014], p. 383
plenty of discussion in the literature, these other elements have received a lot 
less attention. But just as an account of moral virtue which puts too much 
emphasis on what the virtuous person believes threatens to miss out on 
some central elements of virtue, so an account of faith that puts too much 
emphasis on what the person of faith believes (or has confidence in) runs the 
risk of missing out some central elements of faith. 
 My aim in this paper has been to take some steps towards remedying 
this imbalance. I have argued that faith involves certain conative states as 
well as know how and that these elements are crucial to performing acts of 
faith. I have then drawn out some consequences of this for the epistemology 
of faith: the role that testimony and expertise play in acquiring and 
transmitting faith, the epistemic role of religious practices, as well as Pascal’s 
advice on how to acquire faith.27 
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